Monday, October 25 2010
Russian media scoop of the day
1. Nemtsov Called for Medvedev's Recognition that Putin is to be Blamed for Khodorkovsky's case. (in Russian) - Gazeta.ru
SUMMARY - Opposition's Boris Nemtsov has requested that Medvedev grants amnesty to Khodorkonsky and Lebedev, blaming Putin for falsely blaming former YUKOS executives in ordering murders during their reign on top of once Russia's largest private Oil company.
Nemtsov suggests that such a gesture would ascertain Medvedev's image as a truly democratic President of Russia.
RUSSIAN VERSION: Оппозиционер Борис Немцов выступил с открытым обращением к президенту Медведеву, в котором назвал премьер-министра Путина заказчиком дела Ходорковского, так как Путин «страдает ходорофобией в особо тяжелой форме», сообщает пресс-служба движения «Солидарность».
Photo by AFP
Немцов призывает Медведева помиловать Ходорковского и Лебедева, обвиняя Путина во лжи относительно причастности бывших руководителей ЮКОСа к убийствам людей.
Ходорковского оппозиционер называет «мучеником в глазах миллионов людей» и говорит Медведеву, что «помилование Ходорковского и Лебедева войдет в историю как настоящий президентский поступок, благородный и честный».
Новость на сайте «Газеты.Ru»
2. Russia, Poland to sign a gas deal tis week - RIA Novosti
MOSCOW, October 25 (RIA Novosti) - Russia and Poland will sign an agreement this week that will put an end to a four-year gas transit row between Moscow and Warsaw, Russian Deputy Energy Minister Anatoly Yanovsky said on Monday.
Russian Deputy Energy Minister Anatoly Yanovsky (right)© RIA Novosti. Anton Denisov
"Not today, but I believe, within a week, no later," Yanovsky said.
The Energy Ministry has ordered companies to prepare contracts to 2037, to expand gas supplies to Poland and "improve the tariff", he added.
Russia and Poland agreed the text of the document on October 17. Gas will be supplied until 2022 while transit will be maintained until 2019, as in the previous contract.
The agreement also envisages a gradual increase in Russian gas supplies to Poland, from 9.7 bcm in 2010 to 11 bcm in 2012. EuRoPolGaz, a Russian-Polish joint venture operating the Polish stretch of the Yamal-Europe pipeline will set the transit tariff.
The Polish government has approved the agreement and is now waiting for EuRoPolGaz and Gaz-System gas operators to sign it.
Russian and Indian troops completed a drill to kill a fictional terrorist leader in the Indian Himalayas as part of the Indra-2010 joint military exercises, which finished on Saturday.
"The experience we gained from the exercises is useful. We learned a lot from our Russian colleagues," Commander of the Indian contingent Brigadier-General Gopal said.
The commander of the Russian contingent, Major-General Vladimir Glinin said he was satisfied with the results of the military exercises.
The INDRA-2010 exercises were launched on October 16 at Chaubattia, in Uttarakhand, a mountainous area near India's border with China and Nepal.
Russia sent more than 200 troops from its 34th mountain brigade, based in the North Caucasus, to join the Indian troops in the drills.
The Indian and Russian military have conducted joint INDRA exercises since 2003, including biannual peacekeeping drills.
India's military cooperation with Russia goes back nearly half a century, and the Asian country accounts for about 40 percent of Russian arms exports.
CHAUBATTIA (India), October 23 (RIA Novosti)
4. From Valdai Discussion Club - A New Approach to the Russia-Georgia Conflict - RIA Novosti
Samuel Charap, Cory Welt
Georgian-Abkhazian border
© RIA Novosti. Mikhail Mordasov
More than two years have passed since the war between Russia and Georgia, and the casual observer might be deluded into thinking that the situation in the South Caucasus has reached a new, stable equilibrium. Russian tanks are firmly ensconced in the two Georgian breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Russia and three other states now recognize as independent. Those tanks are not pulling back anytime soon and will deter any rash Georgian efforts to take back their territories by force. The Russian military presence in internationally recognized Georgia is an irritant for Russia’s relations with the West, but it is not an impassable roadblock. Some point to North Cyprus, which complicates Turkey’s European Union membership aspirations but does not prevent cooperation with the West, as a “model.” In other words, get used to the status quo, since it will be here for the long haul.
This status quo in the South Caucasus, however, is not sustainable. The reason: it satisfies none of the parties in the conflict, including Russia. And it is a situation that could easily, and rapidly degenerate given the lack of effective tools for preventing renewed conflict—in particular on the South Ossetian side, where local authorities have pulled out of the existing Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, or IPRM—a multilateral early warning system. There is also an unstable environment along administrative lines between the regions and the rest of Georgia, where cross-border detentions, thefts, and kidnappings have become regular occurrences. If the tentative peace deteriorates in the South Caucasus, the humanitarian, strategic, and domestic-political consequences (say goodbye to New START ratification) would be disastrous.
The combination of discontent and instability could well spark a second conflict. Indeed, we came very close to just that in the run-up to the first anniversary of the war in August 2009. Details are sketchy, but U.S. officials describe what happened as a near miss that was only prevented by Washington intervening with Moscow at the highest levels of the government.
But the situation presents the Obama administration with an opportunity given that no party to the conflict—not Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia, nor Georgia—is reconciled to today’s reality. The United States currently lacks a comprehensive policy on the conflict, one that could accomplish four key objectives: preventing a future outbreak of violence; managing the humanitarian situation on the ground; reducing the conflict’s role as a roadblock to cooperating with Russia on other critical security issues; and facilitating the reunification of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia in the long term.
Discussion in Washington on these issues has unfortunately devolved into a farce. Analysts and commentators are not debating how the United States can practically achieve these goals, but rather arguing about the merits of “taking a stand” and “showing support” for Georgia—positions that the Georgian government desires and actively inserts into the U.S. domestic foreign policy debate, but which hold little hope for changing the situation on the ground.
Would a meeting between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and U.S. President Barack Obama at the April Nuclear Security Summit have sent those Russian tanks rolling back north? Would a U.S. declaration that the Russian military presence constitutes an occupation under international law make Putin rethink his policies? And would the “antitank capabilities, air defenses, early-warning radar, and other defensive systems” that Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) has called for really bring stability to the region or deter a potential future Russian invasion? The answer to all these questions is clearly no.
Calls for arms sales to Georgia in particular have become more and more vociferous, both from the Georgian government and the Obama administration’s critics. But the administration’s continuation of an (unspoken) policy dating from the Bush era of not authorizing the sale of serious military hardware to Georgia rests on a conclusion that the Georgian armed forces lack the capabilities to be able to use the weapons safely and responsibly. Questions also linger about the judgment of Saakashvili and his government when it comes to the use of force, especially after the EU-commissioned report on the August 2008 war suggested that the country’s highly centralized decision-making processes were a major factor leading to the rapid escalation of violence. In other words, there are good reasons to conclude that arms sales would actually further destabilize the situation, not improve it.
It is true, however, that the Obama administration’s policies have yet to produce a breakthrough. The administration provides a massive amount of financial assistance to Georgia and, like all administrations before it, counsels “strategic patience”—the notion that Georgia will eventually entice Abkhazia and South Ossetia into closer association or even incorporation through comparatively attractive political, social, and economic development.
The U.S. government at the same time sternly repeats to Russia the mantra of “abide by your international commitments,” in this case the ceasefire agreement which states that all forces should withdraw to pre-war positions and numbers. But the Russians say that they fulfilled the agreement—the forces that fought did withdraw; it’s just that new ones took their place. And they say the document was signed in a world where the “independent states” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which now have basing agreements with Russia, didn’t exist. That world, they explain, is no more.
The United States is also involved in regular multilateral consultations in Geneva on the conflict, which sound like painfully tedious affairs: face-to-face reiteration of vehement disagreements and dramatic walkouts by Abkhazian and South Ossetian representatives. But despite these efforts, current U.S. policy has not done much to further the conflict prevention or management goals.
A realistic discussion about the conflict, to say nothing of an effective conflict policy itself, must begin by acknowledging that Russian cooperation is necessary for progress. Neither Washington nor Tbilisi are in a position to strong-arm Moscow into making concessions on this issue. The Obama administration has made a conscious decision not to condition other aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship on progress on the conflict—a sensible policy given the multitude of critical security issues on the bilateral agenda. And Georgia’s structural power asymmetry will forever deny it the upper hand. In other words, viewing the discussion with Russia in terms of leverage, demands, and concessions is a dead-end. The current approach of pushing Russia to comply with a ceasefire treaty that it considers null and void has little chance of achieving results, at least in the short to medium term.
The ultimate goal of full Russian compliance with the ceasefire (in spirit and letter) should remain unchanged, but the Obama administration should reframe its discussion with its Russian interlocutors. The United States should make clear that it does not share Russia’s view of the legality of its military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but that the two do share an interest in avoiding a second conflict and managing the humanitarian fallout of the first. And U.S. officials should develop an incremental action plan that includes steps that all sides can take. Such an action plan could include:
* Returning the South Ossetians to the existing Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism without conditions or delay.
* An elaborated nonuse of force agreement signed by all parties to the conflict: Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
* A monitoring visit to the South Ossetian side of the administrative line by international representatives—preferably from the existing EU Monitoring Mission—followed by periodic, scheduled visits if successful as an interim step toward the ultimate aim of providing regular monitoring access to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
* A softening of the “border control” regime to provide for secure but free movement of people, transportation, and goods across administrative lines, especially for the Akhalgori region of South Ossetia. This would ideally involve replacing the current Russian-run system with one manned by Georgians, South Ossetians, and Abkhazians with international assistance.
* Multilateral discussions on reconstruction, restitution, or return for all those who suffered from conflict in 2008 and in the South Ossetian conflict of 1989-1992, followed by eventual talks on the thornier issues of displaced people from the Abkhazian conflict of 1992-1993.
* A voluntary freeze on buildup of Russian military forces in the territories.
* Withdrawal of Russian troops from Perevi, a village acknowledged by all to be outside South Ossetia.
These steps are explicitly not tied directly to a desired end state. Conflict resolution remains the ultimate goal, but what is most important now is preventing renewed violence, managing the impact of the conflict on people’s lives, and achieving some tangible progress. Some measure of momentum would go a long way to reassuring the Georgian government that the United States takes this issue seriously, which might prevent rash moves, such as the War of the Worlds TV broadcast in March, which portrayed a fake Russian invasion during the evening news.
We can expect the Russians to take this overture seriously because it would bring at least tacit recognition that some measure of Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is inevitable in the near term. It would also make clear that conflict prevention, management, and resolution represent a collaborative effort that is about more than Russian concessions.
But the most significant reason why progress might now be possible is Moscow’s discontent with the current situation. South Ossetia remains a black hole for the Russian budget despite numerous high-level visits, installation of native Russians in the local government, decrees banning middlemen, and other budgetary oversight measures. The leadership there has become adept at stealing millions of rubles that Moscow has committed for reconstructing the region. The government in Abkhazia, by contrast, is entering more and more into conflicts with Moscow, in particular over the restitution of property to Russians who claim that their property was expropriated by Abkhazian authorities. A group of these Russians has actually sued the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its failure to defend their property rights. Following an initial dismissal, the group appealed and has threatened to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights if the Russian legal system does not provide them justice.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin confirmed Russia’s ambivalence with his recent answer to a question about the region’s future at a meeting with experts on September 6 in Sochi. He said that Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia will have to work together to determine the future character of their relations. He added that he didn’t know what form those relations would take, saying, “I can’t say whether it will be inter-state or not.” In other words, he suggested that the reincorporation of the territories is not out of the question. There was no talk of the eternal independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Other senior Russian officials portray the decision to recognize the two regions as having been forced on them by the military brass who demanded a legal footing (those basing agreements) for their long-term presence.
The policy implications of the change in Moscow’s tone remain unclear. Putin has certainly said a lot of things over the years that have not translated into actions. But we in the West need to recognize that changing Moscow’s calculations by pursuing conflict prevention and management as shared interests is far more important than “taking a stand for Georgia” when it comes to improving the untenable situation in the region. Arms sales are not the answer.
Samuel Charap is Associate Director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress. Cory Welt is associate director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
This status quo in the South Caucasus, however, is not sustainable. The reason: it satisfies none of the parties in the conflict, including Russia. And it is a situation that could easily, and rapidly degenerate given the lack of effective tools for preventing renewed conflict—in particular on the South Ossetian side, where local authorities have pulled out of the existing Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, or IPRM—a multilateral early warning system. There is also an unstable environment along administrative lines between the regions and the rest of Georgia, where cross-border detentions, thefts, and kidnappings have become regular occurrences. If the tentative peace deteriorates in the South Caucasus, the humanitarian, strategic, and domestic-political consequences (say goodbye to New START ratification) would be disastrous.
The combination of discontent and instability could well spark a second conflict. Indeed, we came very close to just that in the run-up to the first anniversary of the war in August 2009. Details are sketchy, but U.S. officials describe what happened as a near miss that was only prevented by Washington intervening with Moscow at the highest levels of the government.
But the situation presents the Obama administration with an opportunity given that no party to the conflict—not Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia, nor Georgia—is reconciled to today’s reality. The United States currently lacks a comprehensive policy on the conflict, one that could accomplish four key objectives: preventing a future outbreak of violence; managing the humanitarian situation on the ground; reducing the conflict’s role as a roadblock to cooperating with Russia on other critical security issues; and facilitating the reunification of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia in the long term.
Discussion in Washington on these issues has unfortunately devolved into a farce. Analysts and commentators are not debating how the United States can practically achieve these goals, but rather arguing about the merits of “taking a stand” and “showing support” for Georgia—positions that the Georgian government desires and actively inserts into the U.S. domestic foreign policy debate, but which hold little hope for changing the situation on the ground.
Would a meeting between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and U.S. President Barack Obama at the April Nuclear Security Summit have sent those Russian tanks rolling back north? Would a U.S. declaration that the Russian military presence constitutes an occupation under international law make Putin rethink his policies? And would the “antitank capabilities, air defenses, early-warning radar, and other defensive systems” that Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) has called for really bring stability to the region or deter a potential future Russian invasion? The answer to all these questions is clearly no.
Calls for arms sales to Georgia in particular have become more and more vociferous, both from the Georgian government and the Obama administration’s critics. But the administration’s continuation of an (unspoken) policy dating from the Bush era of not authorizing the sale of serious military hardware to Georgia rests on a conclusion that the Georgian armed forces lack the capabilities to be able to use the weapons safely and responsibly. Questions also linger about the judgment of Saakashvili and his government when it comes to the use of force, especially after the EU-commissioned report on the August 2008 war suggested that the country’s highly centralized decision-making processes were a major factor leading to the rapid escalation of violence. In other words, there are good reasons to conclude that arms sales would actually further destabilize the situation, not improve it.
It is true, however, that the Obama administration’s policies have yet to produce a breakthrough. The administration provides a massive amount of financial assistance to Georgia and, like all administrations before it, counsels “strategic patience”—the notion that Georgia will eventually entice Abkhazia and South Ossetia into closer association or even incorporation through comparatively attractive political, social, and economic development.
The U.S. government at the same time sternly repeats to Russia the mantra of “abide by your international commitments,” in this case the ceasefire agreement which states that all forces should withdraw to pre-war positions and numbers. But the Russians say that they fulfilled the agreement—the forces that fought did withdraw; it’s just that new ones took their place. And they say the document was signed in a world where the “independent states” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which now have basing agreements with Russia, didn’t exist. That world, they explain, is no more.
The United States is also involved in regular multilateral consultations in Geneva on the conflict, which sound like painfully tedious affairs: face-to-face reiteration of vehement disagreements and dramatic walkouts by Abkhazian and South Ossetian representatives. But despite these efforts, current U.S. policy has not done much to further the conflict prevention or management goals.
A realistic discussion about the conflict, to say nothing of an effective conflict policy itself, must begin by acknowledging that Russian cooperation is necessary for progress. Neither Washington nor Tbilisi are in a position to strong-arm Moscow into making concessions on this issue. The Obama administration has made a conscious decision not to condition other aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship on progress on the conflict—a sensible policy given the multitude of critical security issues on the bilateral agenda. And Georgia’s structural power asymmetry will forever deny it the upper hand. In other words, viewing the discussion with Russia in terms of leverage, demands, and concessions is a dead-end. The current approach of pushing Russia to comply with a ceasefire treaty that it considers null and void has little chance of achieving results, at least in the short to medium term.
The ultimate goal of full Russian compliance with the ceasefire (in spirit and letter) should remain unchanged, but the Obama administration should reframe its discussion with its Russian interlocutors. The United States should make clear that it does not share Russia’s view of the legality of its military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but that the two do share an interest in avoiding a second conflict and managing the humanitarian fallout of the first. And U.S. officials should develop an incremental action plan that includes steps that all sides can take. Such an action plan could include:
* Returning the South Ossetians to the existing Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism without conditions or delay.
* An elaborated nonuse of force agreement signed by all parties to the conflict: Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
* A monitoring visit to the South Ossetian side of the administrative line by international representatives—preferably from the existing EU Monitoring Mission—followed by periodic, scheduled visits if successful as an interim step toward the ultimate aim of providing regular monitoring access to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
* A softening of the “border control” regime to provide for secure but free movement of people, transportation, and goods across administrative lines, especially for the Akhalgori region of South Ossetia. This would ideally involve replacing the current Russian-run system with one manned by Georgians, South Ossetians, and Abkhazians with international assistance.
* Multilateral discussions on reconstruction, restitution, or return for all those who suffered from conflict in 2008 and in the South Ossetian conflict of 1989-1992, followed by eventual talks on the thornier issues of displaced people from the Abkhazian conflict of 1992-1993.
* A voluntary freeze on buildup of Russian military forces in the territories.
* Withdrawal of Russian troops from Perevi, a village acknowledged by all to be outside South Ossetia.
These steps are explicitly not tied directly to a desired end state. Conflict resolution remains the ultimate goal, but what is most important now is preventing renewed violence, managing the impact of the conflict on people’s lives, and achieving some tangible progress. Some measure of momentum would go a long way to reassuring the Georgian government that the United States takes this issue seriously, which might prevent rash moves, such as the War of the Worlds TV broadcast in March, which portrayed a fake Russian invasion during the evening news.
We can expect the Russians to take this overture seriously because it would bring at least tacit recognition that some measure of Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is inevitable in the near term. It would also make clear that conflict prevention, management, and resolution represent a collaborative effort that is about more than Russian concessions.
But the most significant reason why progress might now be possible is Moscow’s discontent with the current situation. South Ossetia remains a black hole for the Russian budget despite numerous high-level visits, installation of native Russians in the local government, decrees banning middlemen, and other budgetary oversight measures. The leadership there has become adept at stealing millions of rubles that Moscow has committed for reconstructing the region. The government in Abkhazia, by contrast, is entering more and more into conflicts with Moscow, in particular over the restitution of property to Russians who claim that their property was expropriated by Abkhazian authorities. A group of these Russians has actually sued the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its failure to defend their property rights. Following an initial dismissal, the group appealed and has threatened to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights if the Russian legal system does not provide them justice.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin confirmed Russia’s ambivalence with his recent answer to a question about the region’s future at a meeting with experts on September 6 in Sochi. He said that Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia will have to work together to determine the future character of their relations. He added that he didn’t know what form those relations would take, saying, “I can’t say whether it will be inter-state or not.” In other words, he suggested that the reincorporation of the territories is not out of the question. There was no talk of the eternal independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Other senior Russian officials portray the decision to recognize the two regions as having been forced on them by the military brass who demanded a legal footing (those basing agreements) for their long-term presence.
The policy implications of the change in Moscow’s tone remain unclear. Putin has certainly said a lot of things over the years that have not translated into actions. But we in the West need to recognize that changing Moscow’s calculations by pursuing conflict prevention and management as shared interests is far more important than “taking a stand for Georgia” when it comes to improving the untenable situation in the region. Arms sales are not the answer.
Samuel Charap is Associate Director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress. Cory Welt is associate director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
This article first appeared on http://www.americanprogress.org/
Wednesday, September 29 2010
Russian media scoop of the day
Yesterday Mayor Luzhkov was sacked from his position by a presidential Decree. Moscow is soon to elect a new mayor, all media and opposition pamphlets are set. His ansence from Moscow during the smog days would have been considered a mitigating circumstance had he been staying in a Russian province. But no, the long-time Tzar of Moscow had preferred an Austrian summer retreat better. Moreover, budgetary misdemeanors usual to the ins and outs of large scale projects during the past two decades have now become an augmented summa that can be shoveled along with other arguments justifying his shoot down the apparatchik stairs. His wife is Russia's richest businesswoman, mainly due to running a construction supplies conglomerate facilitating the immense construction projects launched by the Moscow government. While there are many speculations going around of the entire political reasoning behind this true "change of an era", it's been revealed today by RIA News that Mr. Luzhkov had addressed a letter to president Medvedev at the time when the latter was issuing the "firing decree".
1. Russian press unveils letter to Medvedev from dismissed Moscow mayor - Ria Novosti "You need a different Moscow mayor, who can be your own. Luzhkov is independent and inconvenient," the letter, which is believed to be authentic, says.
"It is necessary to start preparing for the big elections early and appoint another [mayor]. That is clear," Luzhkov continues, presumably alluding to the 2012 presidential elections in which Medvedev is expected to face off against his long-time mentor Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who has hinted he is going to make a bid to return to the presidency.
11:33 29/09/2010 © RIA Novosti. Mikhail Fomichev
While the Luzhkov saga was picking up a hit on internal political stage, the RT channel attracted a sensationalized attention to its newsfeed by quoting Daniel Estulin in his claims that the US was busy building bases in Afghanistan, essentially pointed against Russia.
There is no evidence presented by Mr. Estulin, whose famous coverage of the highly secretive Bilderberg Group has brought him fame amongst anti-globalists. While he has factual evidence to back his Bilderberg Group analyses, the evidence on US' Afghan bases being aimed at Russia is scarce, to say the least (or rather addressed to sources that cannot be named). A famed conspirologist, Mr. Estulin nevertheless lacks in logical explanations as to why would the US go ahead with such a project if this August the US has given a green light to the arms delivery of weapons by Russia to Afghanistan. And if we are to draw any theories in this case, we could get a far more fascinating picture far from conspiracy. During the weather crises, Russian wheat growth has been greatly compromised to an extent that the usual delivery of wheat to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America cannot be performed by Russia solely.
Russia plans to keep its wheat reserves for the internal market, whereas the US promptly suggested to cover for Russia at necessary wheat quota levels. Hence, while Russia allowed partial access of the US to its wheat market, the US reimbursed the gesture by giving Russia a partial access to Afghanistan. This has been going on by a measure of fact, backed by the pack of bilateral agreements signed between the US-Russia presidents' summit. Yes, there have been accusations from home to home leaders but the fact remains the two are currently more on a cooperation mode than confrontation. All in all, the style of RT reporting calls for a great fiction suspense for than news channel reporting.
2. “US is building secret bases in Afghanistan for war against Russia” – journalist - RT -
Investigative journalist Daniel Estulin, who has made it his mission to uncover the secrets of the Bilderberg Group, has shared some of his revelations with RT.
The Bilderberg Group is one of the most secretive and exclusive clubs that attracts some of the world's most powerful people.
Its meetings are invitation only and take place under tight security, away from the prying eyes of the public and the press.
Critics of the organization, including Estulin, claim they are deciding international policy in a way that is far removed from democracy.
“In Russia you have democracy so it is much easier to infiltrate certain organizations as in the 1990s in an operation called Barbarossa-2. They used the NGOs, the American Aid, the International Monetary Fund, the George Soros Organization to try and actually infiltrate and destroy Russian society from within. Today, the US government is building 13 secret bases in Afghanistan for the forward push to an eventual war against Russia,” Estulin told RT.
Watch the video report at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPLAOtf6t_4
To prove our case further, here's another fresh-from-the-oven news on a rare collaboration effort between the two "foes".
3. Russia bans Iran missile delivery - Al Jazeera - "Citing UN sanctions, Russia has cancelled a planned sale of advanced missiles to Iran. Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian president, has issued a decree prohibiting the delivery of S-300 air defence missile systems and other weapons to Iran.
Reuters news agency reports that the presidential decree, issued on Wednesday, brings trade rules for Russia and its companies into line with the sanctions, pleasing the United States and other Western nations that are deeply worried about Iran's military capability.
"What's interesting about this order is that it not only bans the sale of surface-to-air S-300 missiles, it also bans other weapons system," Alexander Nekrassov, former adviser to the Kremlin, told Al Jazeera.
He added that the decree also bans senior Iranian officials "who are somehow linked to the nuclear programme" from visiting Russia."
Iran could use surface-to-air missiles to protect its nuclear facilities [AFP]
A big dipomatic achievement indeed, yet partial in nature for Russia still reserves the right to sell similar missiles to Syria - "Iran announced a deal to acquire S-300s from Russia in 2007, and Russia has used it as a lever in its diplomacy with Tehran and the West.
Russia's ties with Israel and the United States have been warming and the Kremlin has expressed growing irritation with Tehran's defiance of efforts to rein in its nuclear programme. Yet Russia angered Israel and caused US concern by saying last week that it would go ahead with a $300 million sale of Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles to Syria.
And now, back home again to get further clues on the soap opera evolving due to Luzhkov's sacking. Only available in Russian, the following piece of news reports that due to soon-to-be-formalized charges of corruption, the Vice-Mayor of Moscow Alexander Ryabinin has resigned or rather been pushed to resign (*note: a similar chance of "dignified exit" was provided to Luzhkov, too, yet he'd ignored). Following the dramatic developments of the Luzhkov affair and the clear sign that the Kremlin won't back down on its tournée of corruption cracking (as promised by both Putin and Medvedev administrations), we should expect more of similar resignations... and not just in Moscow.
4. Подследственный вице-мэр Москвы подал в отставку - Lenta.ru - Александр Рябинин возглавлял Контрольный комитет Москвы (Москонтроль). Первое уголовное дело в отношении него было возбуждено в марте. Вскоре оно было закрыто, но в мае было заведено новое. Формально 29 сентября в отставку было отправлено все правительство Москвы. Об этом сообщал «Интерфакс» со ссылкой на источник в близком окружении Ресина. При этом нынешнее правительство продолжает осуществлять свои полномочия до формирования нового состава кабинета, а все члены правительства получили к своим должностям приставку «исполняющий обязанности».
© Rambler
Александр Рябинин. Кадр телеканала «Россия 24»
... And a last one. In an effort to bring and end to conspiracies over the death of Polish president Lech Kaczynski in tragic airplane accident when TU-154 crashed killing the president, his wife and 94 people on board, today the Polish side has announced that it admits in bearing "the bigger share" in the catastrophe. As the Polish National Security Committee is about to issue a final announcement on the accident, the experts have publicized certain cautions to be taken to avoid further accidents, including timely upgrade of Presidential airplane, investment in several airplanes and a passage of law whereby the President and the Prime-Minister of the country as well as the Leaders of the two Houses of the Polish Parliament will be precluded from flying in the same airliner.
5. Польша взяла на себя вину за гибель Качиньского - Utro.ru - "По словам чиновника, причиной падения Ту-154 могли стать более десятка различных факторов. Среди них глава комиссии выделил недочеты в обучении пилотов, недостаточную подготовку воздушного судна к полету и нежелание экипажа следовать установленным правилам. «Попытка пилотов приземлиться в условиях густого тумана была абсолютно иррациональна», — цитируют Клиха польские СМИ.
Image by RIA News
О вине польского правительства в трагедии Ту-154 говорил ранее и экс-кандидат в президенты Польши Ярослав Качиньский. По его мнению, трагедия произошла вследствие того, что правительство решило сэкономить и отказалось закупить для президента новый самолет.
Отметим, что в среду состоится очередное заседание Совета национальной безопасности (СНБ) Польши. Как ожидается, на нем будет обсужден документ, анализирующий апрельскую авиакатастрофу под Смоленском и дающий рекомендации, как избежать подобных аварий в будущем. Одной из мер безопасности станет запрет на совместные полеты президента Польши, премьер-министра и председателей обеих палат парламента."
Monday, September 27 2010
Russian media scoop of the day
1. RusAl seeks stake in China's NORINCO sales subsidiary - RIA News - "The implementation of these investment plans will make it possible to expand the Russian capacity for the manufacture of products with high-added value and increase exports of Russian aluminum output to China and other Asian countries," RusAl said.
Dmitry Medvedev, Hu Jintao sign two joint statements, 12:16 27/09/2010, © RIA Novosti. Mikhail Klementiev
2. Syria may save Tupolev planes from extinction - RIA News - A Syrian contract for supply of Russian Tu-204 airliners could save the Tupolev aircraft brand from extinction,Russian media said on Monday. Atlant-Soyuz, an airline controlled by the Moscow city government and the only current customer for Tu-204 jets, recently scrapped a contract to purchase 15 of the aircraft.
Russian Tu-204 passenger plane, © RIA Novosti. Dmitriy Korobeynikov
3. Телеакадемики уважают позицию Познера в связи с инцидентом на «ТЭФИ» - РИА Новости - "Телеведущий Владимир Познер заявил в понедельник в эфире радиостанции «Эхо Москвы» о том, что он может выйти из состава Телеакадемии из-за того, что имя журналистки Мананы Асламазян, которой была присуждена специальная награда, не было объявлено на церемонии.
«Отказ прилюдно чествовать Манану Асламазян, которую называют с полным основанием „мамой российского регионального телевидения“, это невероятно неприличная ситуация, в которую поставила себя Академия. Мне за эту ситуацию очень стыдно и очень жалко», — заявила Максимовская."
ALEXEY DRUZHININ/AFP/Getty Images
Now we have China informing Japan -- and the rest of Asia -- that the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea are its territory in which to fish and whatever else it wishes. Like Russia, Beijing did so by demonstrating that it was prepared to go to almost any extreme -- in this case short of war, but including the crippling of several Japanese industries -- to press its territorial claim. This includes rights over the big oil and gas reserves in the islands. Today Japan blinked. After this, will Japan continue the presumption that it is in charge of what it calls the Senkaku islands? Not if it wishes to continue to manufacture the Prius, as Andrew Leonard notes at Salon.
Monday, September 27 2010
Etiquette 101: Russia
Work it, girl: Bathrobes and curlers are fine for home, but you'd better be dressed to the nines when you step out (the more brand names, the better). http://www.concierge.com/cntraveler/articles/502072?mbid=synd_ytravel
It's the biggest, baddest, most billionaire-heavy country in Europe—are you ready for it? How to flirt, drink, and bathe (yes, bathe) in the new Russia
Soviet-era immigrants in the United States are often shocked when they actually make it back to Putin's Russia: Everywhere are status symbols, glitzy sushi joints, and fortunes made and lost with each blip in the price of oil. If it's that hard for former citizens to adjust, just imagine what a kindly Midwestern businessman (or woman) goes through. Russia and Europe can feel like continents separated by a common lineage: Modern Moscow can feel like London but also Dubai, St. Petersburg is Paris with a little Mumbai thrown in, and the vast frontier can feel like the Far East (because part of it is). The disorientation has less to do with architecture than with the little tics of dress and behavior—an effusive toast, a brusque rebuke, an offhand remark, or an exotic spice that lets you know you're not in Denmark anymore. You can have a lot of fun—and do a lot of business—in Russia, provided you bring an open mind, a little backbone, and some patience for a culture, a government, and an economy that sometimes fly high but often lose their footing.
Part I: BUSINESS
Rules of the Business Meeting
"Trust but verify" is one Russian cliché that still rings true—and nowhere more so than in the business meeting. As a foreigner, your value as a colleague and partner is being constantly appraised, from the first firm handshake to the last vodka at thebanya. Ilya Merenzon, a Russian-born businessman (and publisher of Russia! Magazine) who splits his time between Russia and the United States, trots out a common Russian expression: "You need to prove that you're not a camel," he says. Camel, in this case, means phony. Luckily, there are some simple ways to make a good first impression.
"Trust but verify" is one Russian cliché that still rings true—and nowhere more so than in the business meeting. As a foreigner, your value as a colleague and partner is being constantly appraised, from the first firm handshake to the last vodka at thebanya. Ilya Merenzon, a Russian-born businessman (and publisher of Russia! Magazine) who splits his time between Russia and the United States, trots out a common Russian expression: "You need to prove that you're not a camel," he says. Camel, in this case, means phony. Luckily, there are some simple ways to make a good first impression.
How to Be Taken Seriously
1. Look Good: Men and women in Russia carry around little sponges to repolish their shoes before entering the office. If you're a man, get a haircut; if you're a woman, get a manicure. A clean-cut appearance is the best place to start. Andrew Paulson, chairman of the media company SUP (which owns LiveJournal in Russia), says, "If you show up at a meeting and you're a little bit relaxed in your dress, there are many people who might assume that you're a driver."
1. Look Good: Men and women in Russia carry around little sponges to repolish their shoes before entering the office. If you're a man, get a haircut; if you're a woman, get a manicure. A clean-cut appearance is the best place to start. Andrew Paulson, chairman of the media company SUP (which owns LiveJournal in Russia), says, "If you show up at a meeting and you're a little bit relaxed in your dress, there are many people who might assume that you're a driver."
2. Telegraph Your Status: Merenzon remembers meeting a deputy in the mayor's office in Chelyabinsk who told him, "I never start a meeting before seeing what car the person drives. If it's less than a BMW or a Mercedes. . . ." Well, you know. Preferably you'll be sporting at least one Italian label, but if your price range is more Men's Wearhouse than Armani, at the very least accessorize with a nice Hermès tie. Flashy accessories—watches and pens—also help. They will be duly noted.
3. Know Your Patronymics: Do enough research before meeting your contacts to learn not just their first and last names but their father's name, because you will be addressing them only by first name and patronymic (e.g., "Alexander Petrovich," rather than "Mr. Volkov"). This will always be included on their business cards and is the respected form of address. It might take a while to switch to just a first name.
4. Line Up Your Business Cards: Most people at a meeting will line up their cards at the table in order to remember the names and seating arrangements. This is not required or ritualized, as in some Asian countries.
5. Like Ranks Sit Across the Table: The highest-ranking person will sit opposite the most important foreign businessman. The others will be more casually arranged, but generally you will not be addressed directly by someone who outranks you. "Generals never talk to the lieutenants," says Merenzon.
6. Shake Hands, but not if You're a Woman: Most women should not expect a handshake at the start of a meeting and probably shouldn't initiate one. Men, on the other hand, will often greet each other every workday morning with a handshake.
7. Be Diplomatic— and Cagey: In conversation, there are some definite topics to treat carefully (see "Part III: Communicating," page 94). "If you're a foreigner, you will be asked how you like Russia," says Merenzon, "and you are expected to say that you love it but you don't fully understand it and need their help." One thing to control is an American's natural tendency to go straight into personal topics like family, upbringing, and education. Paulson summarizes the perception: "Americans can be garrulous and too immediately friendly and are not sufficiently khitriyi [sly]." It helps to preserve a little mystery.
8. Flatter Their Wordliness: When casting about for small talk, especially among business elites, one can't-fail topic is travel. Maybe you've noticed that Russians—long hemmed in by Soviet travel restrictions—are suddenly everywhere. Egypt, Goa, and Turkey are popular vacation spots, spawning entire Russian-speaking service industries. "The Russian who's been to Turkey is the equivalent of the American who's been to Cancún," says Christina Olsson, a corporate lawyer who worked in Russia on and off for ten years. And as a conversation topic, Turkey usually trumps Cancún.
And What You Can Expect
1. A Cornucopia of Caffeine: The array of available coffees and teas has increased exponentially at business meetings lately. A secretary will come around and ask you what you'd prefer.
1. A Cornucopia of Caffeine: The array of available coffees and teas has increased exponentially at business meetings lately. A secretary will come around and ask you what you'd prefer.
2. Plenty of Smoking: Office buildings are not smoke-free environments.
3. Slower Business in the Provinces: To some extent, Moscow has already outgrown many of the rituals of Russian business—nights of vodka drinking, handshake deals, trips to the banya, days of getting-to-know-you time. But the farther out you go into the regional centers (which are growing in importance), the more of such hazing you can expect. This doesn't mean you can dress more casually; on the contrary, people have more to prove in the regions and will take extra care to display their fancy European trappings.
4. Irregular Hours: Don't be surprised if some of your meetings get pushed back well past business hours. Olsson remembers one meeting that was scheduled at nearly midnight—not in a restaurant but in an office building full of secretaries and security guards.
What to Do When You're Not Wearing Anything—theBanya
A bath involving nudity, vodka, and lots of sweat may seem unusual to the uninitiated, but in Russia it was the original pub, a place where the classes could mix, shorn of the ultimate signifier of status (then as now): clothing. These days it's different. Lawrence McDonnell, the American head of Pravda PR and former Moscow resident, has his office across the street from the Sandunovsky Banya, where Russia's elite go to schvitz, and Bentleys are a constant presence out front. In past years, there was a strict schedule: "On Monday it was the mafia, on Tuesday it was the city administration, and on Wednesday it was both," he says. The bath itself is segregated by price level, defeating the purpose of class equality. Banyas of a more proletarian stripe are still found all across Moscow, at the rate of only a few rubles a day. But if you're doing serious business in the city, Sandunovsky will be a place to celebrate with your new colleagues—and maybe even hash out a few details. Look for the following:
A bath involving nudity, vodka, and lots of sweat may seem unusual to the uninitiated, but in Russia it was the original pub, a place where the classes could mix, shorn of the ultimate signifier of status (then as now): clothing. These days it's different. Lawrence McDonnell, the American head of Pravda PR and former Moscow resident, has his office across the street from the Sandunovsky Banya, where Russia's elite go to schvitz, and Bentleys are a constant presence out front. In past years, there was a strict schedule: "On Monday it was the mafia, on Tuesday it was the city administration, and on Wednesday it was both," he says. The bath itself is segregated by price level, defeating the purpose of class equality. Banyas of a more proletarian stripe are still found all across Moscow, at the rate of only a few rubles a day. But if you're doing serious business in the city, Sandunovsky will be a place to celebrate with your new colleagues—and maybe even hash out a few details. Look for the following:
1. There'll be a large anteroom where zakuski (snacks), beer, and vodka are served. Men in towels or in the nude relax here between trips to the parilka (steam room). A good rule of thumb is three visits to the parilka, with breaks at the tables in between.
2. Slippers and felt caps will be available for rent or purchase. You should get both and wear them (your scalp will need protection).
3. Always put a towel between you and the wooden benches in the parilka. That's what the towels are for—not for covering yourself; sitting on the bare wood is considered unsanitary.
4. Usually there'll be two levels of benches. Don't sit on the lower level—it's just for resting the feet.
5. Bring a partner to beat you with veniki, bushy birch or oak branches available for sale (the best will be sold just outside the banya). It may seem like a weird way to get to know each other better, but it feels good (in the way a brutal massage does), and it makes for great bonding.
6. Regular enthusiasts will often bring not only their own hats and slippers (shapochki and tapochki) but special varieties of water or even beer to throw onto the hot stones, which rapidly fills the room with steam. After a particularly good pour, the audience will occasionally break into spontaneous applause.
7. Go light on the vodka or beer, and try not to mix the two. The alternation of heat and cold will make you plenty light-headed.
