There wasn't much sensational in the news of the past two days. It seems the breaking news headlines journalists were taking a break from the intensity of NATO-Russia talks followed by Wikileaks headlines about everyone everywhere that seemingly covered even media majors' work schedules. Nevertheless, I always believed that when they have time, journalists actually write better outside of the fast food chain of media services. Thus, the pages of nearly all serious Russian dailies were covered with rather long analyses on Medvedev's speech at the Federal Council, an important denominator on how he'll do in the upcoming elections, and even longer analyses on what to make of the NATO-Russia talks and all the pro-Western stance the Kremlin has suddenly arrived to.
A huge fan of the Nezavisimaya Gazeta analyses columns on various aspects of internal and external policies of the RF, I nevertheless read through the Kommersant (usually anti-Kremlin in its own cautious, self-censored and diplomatic mannerisms, whereby the reader is always left wondering whose side is the analyst himself on for they avoid to take a stance and make a conclusive point) and Izvestia (always forever pro-Kremlin). Hence, I've only placed a reference link to the one feature of NG I found interesting on today and tomorrow's OSCE meetings in Kazakhstan and have focused instead on the lack of legitimate parallels in the feature analyses on all things Russia and NATO in latest issue of Kommersant's weekly's "Vlast' ".
Kommersant Daily's pages were focused on drawing conclusions on the future of presidential elections in Russia as per Medvedev's speech at the Federal Council. as usual, they're neither here nor there with their conclusions. Yes, Medvedev has pledged more budgetary expenditures in public services for children, mothers, the senior citizens and the army; and somehow, Kommersant is unhappy with that. A pro-elitist stance instead is taken whereby the opposition's view is pushed to the first plan and Medvedev comes out as short of addresses to the "real" problems in the country, which they tuck under the title of "lack of modernisation". From previous developments, it's apparent that Medvedev's stance against corruption IS gaining ground among voters, however the speedy developments post-Luzhkov ousting seem to have surprised the "elitists", a word the oligarchs of all sorts like to call themselves these days. While Medvedev reiterated the lack of democracy in Russia, he hasn't remained ignorant of what it will take to bring a new form of Russian-made democracy to the Federation.
To further their viewpoint, Kommersant have dwelled upon Medvedev's foreign policy from the angle of internal economic situation, supporting their proposition on Medvedev's weaknesses in the feature pages of their political weekly publication "Vlast' ". All kinds of charts and previous citations from Medvedev's and Putin's speeches are used to support the following thesis: every time Russia's economy shows low numbers, Moscow starts to befriend the West and the latter always abuses the gesture by at first going forward and then letting Russia down high and dry. In a setting of a from-induction-to-deduction analyses it appears that all the failures that have ever happened to the country in its modern history of the past two centuries have been a result of sudden pro-Western sentiments - from the last Czar to Gorbachev, to Yeltsin, to Putin and now Medvedev.
On the background of the modern rhythm of globalization and heavily variable terms of warfare tactics and security challenges in nearly every conflict point in the world are lightly brushed aside. The internal economic perimeters of the country are viewed in grim numbers merely in relation to Medvedev's administration's recent commitments for closeness with the EU and NATO, which already is reflecting in the new setting of the two regions' policies towards a line of former USSR countries. Kommersant by choice avoids talking of the simultaneous policy draw ups by the President and the Prime Minister in their analogy not falling short of a synchronized swimming worthy of the Olympic Gold. For the first time in Russia's history the impossible has been achieved - a well strategized policy package is being executed by a team rather than by a singular leader. The double headed eagle now is actually reflected in the two heads - one leading from the Eastern political point of view and the other -Western.
Indeed, this sounds too philosophical. Nevertheless, the realpolitik of Russia today is a strong leadership of two equally strong leaders who are committed to creating a Russian brand for democracy and there obviously cannot be a room for corruption. Has this upset the continuously oligarch-owned "elitist" media outlets? Refraining from drawing parallels from the simultaneous meetings of Medvedev in Lisbon with NATO leaders and Putin in Berlin with previous and current heads of states invited by Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel to brainstorm on the future of the global economy, the authors claim that Medvedev's warming up with NATO has angered the voters, whose economic situation remains unchanged. Not a word about the recent the crackdown on a rather serious oligarchic structure, even be it in the name of shifting players and rules. Indeed, the end of that tunnel is still unpredictable, but thus far, one breaking news after another have and still are ousting one corrupt official after another. Added by a pledge to decrease the beaurocratic apparatus of the Federal Government by 500,000 employees due to ongoing and well structured government modernization strategies by the end of the year 2011, there seems to be a good strong front against all things holding Russia back from the world and herself. All this, from an internal political perspective.
From an external one, somehow Vlast' "forgets" to analyze the matter from the viewpoint of China's growing overt economic and covert military power, the crises in Koreas, unpredictability of Afghanistan and finally the recent backlash with Iran. Indeed, NATO has every reason to shift its focus from Russia to more "hotter" zones in the meantime taking hold of Russia as a partner not in an "I really do love you" but "Keep your friends close, but enemies closer" manner. This may be suitable for Russia only for a decade. But even within that very decade, EU-Russia , Russia-WTO links have more chances of turning into a real efficient system of long term economic security than ever before in BOTH regions' histories. It is apparent that such convergences happen once in a blue moon, but hey we did have a blue moon the weekend the Russia-NATO new partnership framework was drawn.
The same West Kommersant's "Vlast' " so devotedly abhors (in this particular piece) has provided a rather smooth form of use of media if an indirect black PR campaign is to be led and the authors are using the technic masterfully. Whereas Putin spoke of a vivid 5 point plan to make a safe and secure and wide economic space from Dublin to Vladivostok at the same time as Medvedev pitched to the opposition to be more professional and more competitive by taking a stance of constructive criticism, Kommersant - renown for its campaigns for human rights abuse cases (against journalists and political prisoners), has this week fallen short of pointing a black spot on Russia's current leadership's face. Have they appeared in the same dilemma as the leaders of Georgia, Ukraine and Belorussia? A shrewd Putin observer would at least have been knowledgeable in one single constant within the entire complex of PM's ongoing tactics of political wrestling - planned ahead, well strategized, unpredictable, unexpected, last minute results with high efficiency. The grim economic situation within the country is on the large part on the shoulders of post Soviet oligarchic structures and uprooting them is the last bunker of that plan. Is Kommersant utterly upset about the "economic reality" or has its oppositionist leadership lost its raison d'étre and is in as much fear as Luzhkov once his ousting was unavoidable? The patterns in both cases are similar. One thing is clear, something is changing in Moscow and it's changing very fast and the media will need to apply a holistic approach rather than localized anesthesia to catch up with what's coming.
2. Эпоха реверанса Журнал «Власть» № 47 (901) от 29.11.2010 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1545978
3. Карабах и новый саммит ОБСЕ
Можно ли сплошными отказами решить конфликт?
2010-11-30 / Владимир Николаевич Казимиров - посол, первый заместитель председателя Ассоциации российских дипломатов, глава посреднической миссии России, участник и сопредседатель МГ ОБСЕ (1992-1996 годы). http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-11-30/3_kartblansh.html4. Новый проект Великой Европы
Александр Дугин, завкафедрой социологического факультета МГУ http://www.izvestia.ru/comment/article3148891/
